The Real Winner in Gaza Last Week: Iran

In case you haven’t been paying attention to the news lately, Palestinians and Israelis don’t get along very well. In the eight days of fighting between November 16^th and 24^th, an estimated 160 or so Palestinians and 6 Israelis were killed. Small skirmishes like these aren’t meant to garner large-scale strategic effects, but the most recent spat between Israel and Hamas/Gaza did help out one country in the region: Iran. Ok, it was hardly a game-changer for Iran either, but Hamas’ latest rocket attack against Israel—enabled largely by new Fajr-5 rockets imported from Iran—is indicative of Iran’s broader strategic thinking in the region.

Iran’s military and economic support for Hamas is motivated by two key calculations.

Iranian Nuclear Weapons: Why There Won't Be an Arms Race

It’s not hard to find bad takes on what needs to be done about Iran’s nuclear program. Like most complicated political issues, coming up with answers is time consuming and intellectually taxing. On that point, a recent Washington Post column by Henry Kissinger elucidates the conventional thinking of one important—yet woefully misbegotten—viewpoint on the Iranian nuclear arms program: the Middle East nuclear arms race theory (MENART).

Kissinger describes three levels of weaponization: 1. delivery vehicle; 2. capacity to enrich uranium; and 3. development of warheads. He contends that drawing a red line at the third level, Obama’s position, cannot succeed because once a state is able to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), the hardest part, it is a short leap to warhead development. Thus, the line ought to be drawn at HEU enrichment.

Fine. If you want to keep Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, that’s probably right; however, stopping nuclear weaponization is only one part of the process.

Far more important is the rationale for why Iran would want a nuclear weapon and, for the purposes of this brief blog, what the effects of an Iranian nuclear weapon will be.

The Sources of American Exceptionalism

If you do not believe that the United States is an exceptional nation, then you can still go on to lead a very productive, fulfilling life. Promotions, opportunities to show initiative, and the respect of your peers are still attainable goals. This is not true, however, if you aspire to have a career as a United States politician. Presidential elections always at some point have a who-thinks-America-is-more-exceptional debate, particularly on the topic of foreign policy.

America is indeed an exceptional nation; it was the world’s first modern democracy and is still a model liberal society. Having said that, the conventional thinking about America’s exceptional character—capitalism, individualism, pluralism, rags-to-riches opportunism, etc.—misses some important inputs that have created the exceptional nation we all love. America is exceptional for reasons other than just its political institutions and ideology. Two important, often overlooked, factors have been instrumental in the United States’ ability to thrive.

Dear Obama, About Israel and The Palestinians…

Last Wednesday, Marc Lynch blogged about the foreign policy issues that deserved increased attention in Obama’s second administration. In the lineup, as usual, is the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.He wrote, “the new administration should try to take advantage of the reorientation of Hamas toward Qatar, and work with Egypt to make a serious push to finally reconstitute a representative and legitimate Palestinian negotiating partner. It should also do what it can to encourage the renewal of a peace camp in the upcoming Israeli election. Those two steps would at least set the stage for a possible return to peace talks, though I don't think anyone's optimistic.”

Why Your Congressman Has More Character Than Mother Theresa

Why don’t people like politicians? Is it because they’re bad people? Is it because good people can’t make it to the top? It’s hard to say exactly why, but there is no disputing the fact that Americans don’t think particularly highly of their elected officials. Filibusters have dramatically spiked under president Obama and public vitriol is as vitriolic as it has ever been. I posit three causes of this problem and three possible reasons to be optimistic.

Hurricanes and Politics

Hurricane Sandy’s mad dash towards the east coast of the United States—the country’s most valuable real estate—is a good reminder of the unpredictability of international events. Rightly or wrongly, presidents, department secretaries, ranking members of congress, and other important people frequently get blamed for a lot of what goes wrong in this country and, quite often, for what goes wrong outside of it. It varies from case to case as to just how much blame can be placed on individual leaders; as Kanye West has argued, even the effects of hurricanes can be blamed on important political officials, but without question, the mere arrival of a destructive hurricane, while potentially disastrous, is certainly no one’s fault.

But why is it that so many other sticky things which are very difficult to affect (such as unemployment, domestic political disputes abroad like the Arab spring or, even, post-hurricane disaster relief) are blamed on key political leaders? Why aren’t voters more sympathetic to the difficulties of running a highly complex organization like a country? Perhaps the better question is, why would anyone willingly choose a line of work for which there is very little praise when things go well, a never ending supply of vitriol when things go wrong, and the knowledge going in that you could climb the Matterhorn barefoot in January and 50% of the country would still ask why you didn’t surmount Everest?

America's New York Yankees Foreign Policy

Watching the Yankees lose in embarrassing fashion to the Detroit Tigers last week made me realize something: Americans are a lot like Yankee fans. The Yankee fan is unique in that he thinks, starting from the day pitchers and catchers report in February, that it is destiny that the Yankees will win the World Series every single year. The only thing that could possibly stop the Bronx Bombers from laying waste to the major leagues come October is bad leadership, lack of focus, no heart, or something. Usually they’re just really angry at the world. Lost on all Yankee fans is the notion that the other teams are also full of young men who were once young boys that dreamed of playing in the major leagues and when they finally make it to the big stage, they too enjoy winning and try their hardest to do so.

What is Brazil Up To?

What is Brazil up to? That is the question national security planners should be asking. Since abandoning its nuclear weapons program in the late 1990s, Brazil has appeared the model for nonproliferation. Relations with Argentina, its longtime rival, have warmed and the two states even cooperate on nuclear and other security issues. Compared to the Middle East, South America is stable and peaceful, hardly an environment that would necessitate nuclear weapons. Yet, changes in Latin America and a perceived shift in the balance of power away from the West require a reconsideration of that assessment. Moreover, Brazil’s refusal to adopt the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Additional Protocol and its pursuit of nuclear propulsion technology raise worrisome questions about its intentions.

To Brazil, Latin America is not as stable as often believed. To the north, Venezuela chaffs at the prospect of Brazil as regional hegemon. In 2010, Russia and Venezuela reached a deal to build the Latin American country’s first nuclear reactor. Although the project was scrapped after the Fukushima disaster, the prospect remains. Venezuela has also challenged Brazilian influence in Bolivia and Ecuador, two countries that have or have attempted to nationalize the facilities of Petrobras, Brazil’s state oil company. In 2008, the government of Hugo Chavez levied a controversial $282 million tax on a Brazilian construction firm. Such actions have riled Brazilian leaders.

Further north, the United States, long the guarantor of South American stability, appears hamstrung by economic challenges. According to former Argentine diplomat Emilio Cárdenas, Brazil believes that the West is in gradual decline and that Brazil is jockeying with other rising nations for position. This shift in the balance of power engenders a greater degree of uncertainty about U.S. capabilities and intentions in the future. Such uncertainty, in addition to Brazil’s new political and economic prowess, gives it the ability to challenge the U.S. at the margins of its power. Moreover, if the ability of the U.S. to maintain order in the hemisphere is truly constrained, it is incumbent upon the Brazilian government to seek alternative sources of security.

VP Debate and Foreign Policy

At the end of the Vice Presidential debate, Paul Ryan asked the essential question that Americans answer every four years when they think about who should be the next president: “We face a very big choice. What kind of country are we going to be?”

A big problem for the Romney campaign has been painting a distinctly different vision of the future. On foreign policy, the Romney/Ryan ticket is in the awkward position of having to differentiate itself from a foreign policy that has, for the most part, been hiccup-less. As someone who loves foreign affairs, in the eros sense of the word, the VP debate was a can’t miss. The problem is, there just isn’t much difference between Obama’s foreign policy and Romney’s would-be foreign policy.

There is one simple reason for this. The grand strategic debate at the highest level has already been settled: the United States should stay world number one. Foreign policy wonks will debate concepts like off-shore balancing (a strategy of restraint that opts to play regional powers off of each other rather than actively getting involved), selective engagement (a strategy that advocates active US involvement only in the most strategically vital regions), and primacy (a strategy that calls for US dominance and dissuasion of any peers from challenging the U.S.). But the central tenets of American grand strategy since the end of the Cold War have not changed: we need to stay world number one and we need to promote democracy abroad where possible.

We do face a choice this election, but it is a choice about operationalizing a vision for America’s role in the world under primacy.

Appeasement: We Need More of It

Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.

These are not the words of the appeaser-in-chief, Barack Hussein Obama, nor were they the words of the appeaser of all appeasers, Neville Chamberlain. It was actually Winston Churchill who recognized the usefulness of appeasing adversaries in a 1950 speech to the House of Commons.

Appeasement is not a viable strategy anymore. If you want to be president of the United States, you’re better caught saying “f*** Iran” than saying “appease Iran.”  How did it happen that a strategy that was once regarded as a prudent instrument of statecraft – even to the tough-talking, masculine Winston Churchill - has become about as politically tenable as advocating for the repeal of the 19^th amendment? There are two reasons.

It's Not 2001 Anymore.

Last August, David Feith, a regular contributor to the Wall Street Journal penned an op-ed describing how the President Obama allowed the UN to tie his hands in dealing with Syria.

Mr. Feith criticizes the Obama Administration for not leveraging the opportunity to weaken the Iranian regime by taking stronger action against Syria. However, what he suggests - various methods of intervention - is predicated upon a false understanding of why Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons in the first place.

Little Wars, China, and Mobb Deep

At two pivotal moments in its 67 years of hegemony, the United States fought two small wars that were meant to send a message more than they were meant to preserve a vital interest. The first, the Korean War in 1950, was a message to the world that aggression towards one’s neighbors would not be permitted under America’s watch, especially if the aggressors were Communists. The U.S. could have easily survived if the Korean peninsula had become a Communist bastion; a unified Communist Korea would not have posed a security threat. But the U.S. wanted to show that security was not its only priority. Additionally, where the old League of Nations paid mere lip service to collective security and the rule of law, the United States wanted to demonstrate that it was willing to back up its principles with military force even in regions that were not vitally important.

There was a specific audience in Korea: the Soviet Union. And what was that message? Wars of aggression are going to have consequences. As long as you stay in your box, you won’t be touched. Venture outside, and you will get touched.

The Stopping Power of Sugar-Water

Cooperation is hard.

A few weeks ago, my wife noticed some hummingbirds flying around a bush near our apartment. Naturally, my first instinct was to wean them off nature’s goodness and get them hooked to the bird feeder I can see outside my window. It didn’t take long. Within a couple days, the hummers had reconnoitered and assaulted my feeder like a swarm of Iranian speedboats. With eight or so birds eating harmoniously, we were going through four cups of sugar-water a day.

Then, earlier this week, they stopped. I could still see them buzzing around the apartment, but they wouldn’t approach the feeder. Since midterms are coming up, I though the best use of my time would be to sit and observe my feeder to see if I could determine why they had suddenly become less hungry.

The answer was easy: there was a bully! A rogue hummingbird that would attack any other hummers that dared approach his feeder (notice, that the bully is male). Naturally, I began to craft a theory on hummingbird relations.

Assumption 1: Hummingbird food is finite (resources are scare).
Assumption 2: Hummingbirds are territorial and don’t react kindly to encroachments of other hummingbirds (defending the homeland is a vital interest)
Assumption 3: Eventually, weaker hummingbirds will stop trying to eat from my feeder (dissuasion).

The Politics of Last Resort

Nothing captures my attention like a submarine-launched Trident ballistic missile, which is probably why ABC chose to include such imagery (along with shots of a very good looking cast) in its trailers for its latest series, Last Resort.

The Skinny
The show is a military drama about an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) that defies orders to launch its nuclear weapons against Pakistan. It’s an intriguing premise with a long lineage – Crimson Tide, the opening scene of War Games, and, in the inverse, Dr. Strangelove and Fail Safe. Last Resort’s predecessors have varying degrees of plausibility and until the season premieres on September 27^th, we won’t know what geopolitical circumstances the writers have cooked up to make a strike on Pakistan worthwhile.

An astute student of international relations would pose a number of juicy questions: What redline did Pakistan cross to warrant a nuclear attack? How would Pakistan respond to such an attack by its nominal ally? How would India respond? Or China? Or Russia? Or the rest of the Islamic world?

Is Democratic Failure Foreseeable?

According to American values and the US National Security Strategy (see page 37), the US supports the spread of democracy and has dedicated itself to assisting all new and fragile democracies.  The US has also made it clear that we will support any peoples who are seeking democracy.  This can be explained by American policy maker's general acceptance of the democratic peace theory as factual and effective, resulting in policies that are aimed at assisting democratic development worldwide.  The rhetoric paints a nice picture, but where is the contingency plan for assessing the potential for "backsliding"?  "Backsliding" occurs when a democracy transforms into an autocracy.  While I may not personally support the fervor with which the US advocates for the spread of democracy, if policy makers insist on allocating resources to help opposition movements or facilitate the removal of authoritarian leaders, then it is important to keep a close eye on their development in order to protect our interests.

A Better Plan for Port Security

When asked what it would take to ensure an atomic bomb was not smuggled into Washington, D.C., Dr. Robert Oppenheimer replied: “a screwdriver”—to open every single suitcase in the city.

Nearly eight million shipping containers passed through the Port of Los Angeles last year, making it the busiest seaport in the nation. Accounting for what is inside these containers is no easy task. It should be no surprise that authorities across the nation have been unable to meet Congress’ 2006 mandate of screening each and every one of them for nuclear and radiological material. Is such an endeavor possible or even necessary? The answer is no.

Israel Will Not Attack Iran

For years the world has been listening to Israeli threats to attack Iran as a response to their nuclear program. Going back to 2009, Israel was emphatic that their threat was not a bluff.  Fast-forward three years to more recent months and the same debate is ongoing: will Israel really attack Iran? I’m sorry, but I just don’t see why we are still debating this. Would it be bad for the U.S. if Israel attacked Iran? Undoubtedly. But is the threat of an attack a credible one? I think not. While two of Israel’s leaders, Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu, may foolishly support an attack on Iran, their individual influence will not result in Israel being irrational as a state.

A recent article in Foreign Policy Magazine by Shai Feldman supports the notion that the debate is over. Feldman claims Israel will not preemptively attack Iran for two reasons: first, Israeli president Shimon Peres publicly spoke against such a strike; and second, a former defense advisor publicly questioned whether Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu were suitable leaders for Israel. Feldman has a solid point and it is likely that he is correct in his conclusion. This should not be surprising to anyone, though. While this argument cites only two individuals in opposition, their voices represent the view that the majority of Israeli’s hold: striking Iran is not beneficial.

The Benefits of Leaking Intelligence

The recently released book chronicling the SEAL Team 6 raid that killed and captured Osama Bin Laden has garnered a lot of controversy of late for its release of sensitive and classified information. Earlier this summer, a similar string of outcries emerged in response to President Obama’s alleged carelessness in handling classified information in cases such as the so-called “kill list” or the use of cyber attacks against Iran. As conventional wisdom would have it, classified intelligence should never be leaked.

In reality, there are circumstances in which leaked intelligence could actually make a country more secure and could help to deter its adversaries. The best way to approach this issue is to ask the question, under what conditions is leaked intelligence harmful to national security? For sure, it is not in every situation.

Go Ahead and Bomb Iran!

In a characteristically awkward public appearance in 2007, Sen. John McCain sang a parody of the Beach Boys’ Barbara Ann that probably made Kenneth Waltz’s ears bleed, not to mention anyone who likes good music. These days it’s not difficult to find accomplished political commentators arguing for airstrikes, and it is certainly not difficult if one listens to G.O.P. critiques of the defeatist-in-chief, Barack Obama. Surprisingly, however, I’m not all that disturbed by these observations.

Now, anyone who’s ever had a discussion about Iran’s nuclear program with me probably knows that I’m not exactly the Fireman Ed of airstrikes but I’m also not convinced that airstrikes would have the devastating consequences that many proponents of a more diplomatic approach often fear. It doesn’t make much sense to launch a targeted airstrike against Iran’s nuclear facilities at this time but I’m hesitant to accept that doing so would severely damage US security interests. There’s a simple reason: because the US is so much more powerful than Iran, there’s nothing the Ayatollahs could do to strike back at us in a meaningful way.

Is Social Science Scientific?

The first day of class in a political science research methods course I took during the fall semester of my senior year at THE New York State University, the professor asked a question that makes practitioners of the social sciences uncomfortable and gives practitioners of the so-called “hard” sciences an undue sense of superiority: “is political science scientific?” It wasn’t something I’d taken the time to think about before and while I felt like I knew the answer, I wasn’t sure how to express the way I felt. I hung out with a lot of engineers from the Watson School at Binghamton during my undergrad and I was always bothered by their dismissive attitude towards those of us who loved the social sciences. Needless to say there is no debating that we do in fact practice science.

It is not uncommon to hear critics of social science saying things like “what you do isn’t real science” or “human beings are too unpredictable” or “your variables are impossible to quantify.” I feel bad for these people because I don’t think they understand what science actually is. To me, the “scienciness” of your work is not determined by the subject you are studying but by the manner in which you frame your hypotheses and the rigor with which you construct your arguments. A good scientist, no matter the field, has a perpetually inquisitive mind, is always seeking to explain the causal mechanisms of specific phenomena as best as possible, and is always looking to improve upon the existing explanations of his or her surroundings. You don’t need a white lab jacket to think like that.

What is "The Great Game?"

“When you play the game of thrones you win or you die.”
Welcome to The Great Game, the Public Servant’s blog about international security and foreign affairs. Over the next few months you’ll hear from a variety of voices at the Bush School on a variety of engaging topics related to the world around us. Hopefully, you’ll learn a bit about what makes nations tick, why they go to war, and how we – though pawns – can manage conflict.

This brings me to our title – The Great Game. If you read Wikipedia, you’ll find that “The Great Game” dates back to the 19^th century when Russia and Britain jockeyed for influence in Central Asia. Our intention is broader. To us, the Great Game is the contest of nations for influence and power irrespective of region or time (though we’ll focus on the present).

Fortunes are won and lost, nations rise and fall, empires are forged, broken, and replaced. What makes this game so great is that the stakes are astronomical. As Tony Kushner writes, "anything - everything can be lost." Unlike Antonius Block, who challenges Death to a game of chess, we have limited control over our fate.

The affairs of nations are a game not only of calculation but also of chance. How we as a nation behave depends on our assumptions: What is a rational actor? Are states unitary? How does domestic politics affect foreign policy? What is the role of leadership? Of women? Of food? Of energy? Of institutions? Of ideology? Of you and me?

These are questions we’ll debate in the coming months. We welcome your respectful and informed commentary and invite you to play.

Three Soldiers Shortly to Leave for an Officer Cadet Training Unit Playing Chess
by Rodrigo Moynihan (1910-1990)

Deterring Weak States and Provoking Strong Ones

In a July 3rd post on Facebook, Admiral James Stavridis of US European Command mentioned that Spain would be the new homeport of American ballistic missile defense-capable warships starting in 2014. The ships, part of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, complements land-based elements in Romania, Poland and Turkey to protect Europe against possible missile attacks from Iran. However, this missile defense strategy has drawn the ire of Russia and with good reason.

In 1967 during nuclear arms control negotiations, Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin famously declared, “Defense is moral, offense is immoral!” He was replying to US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s assertion that ballistic missile defense undermined the stability of deterrence. To many, McNamara’s argument is counterintuitive. In the face of a threat, our natural inclination is to defend ourselves—to “duck and cover,” build fallout shelters and now employ ballistic missile defense systems deployed in Eastern Europe and soon in Spain.

Deterrence theory requires states to remain equally vulnerable to one another to maintain a stable balance of power—an uncomfortable proposition. The defensive preparations of State A diminish the ability of State B to inflict pain, which means State A can strike first because it can better withstand State B’s retaliatory strike. It is dizzying in its logic, but deterrence worked during the Cold War. We’re all still here.