Little Wars, China, and Mobb Deep

At two pivotal moments in its 67 years of hegemony, the United States fought two small wars that were meant to send a message more than they were meant to preserve a vital interest. The first, the Korean War in 1950, was a message to the world that aggression towards one’s neighbors would not be permitted under America’s watch, especially if the aggressors were Communists. The U.S. could have easily survived if the Korean peninsula had become a Communist bastion; a unified Communist Korea would not have posed a security threat. But the U.S. wanted to show that security was not its only priority. Additionally, where the old League of Nations paid mere lip service to collective security and the rule of law, the United States wanted to demonstrate that it was willing to back up its principles with military force even in regions that were not vitally important.

There was a specific audience in Korea: the Soviet Union. And what was that message? Wars of aggression are going to have consequences. As long as you stay in your box, you won’t be touched. Venture outside, and you will get touched.

The second case, the 1991 Persian Gulf war, the “war of necessity,” was fought under opposite circumstances. The Soviet Union was taking its last gasps and an unprecedented era of unipolarity was coming. There was no great power audience. Instead, this warning was for minor powers, what Lyndon Johnson used to call “piss-ant” countries. The message was still the same, however: wars of aggression will have consequences.

The United States is not at one of these pivotal moments right now, but in the near future, it is certainly plausible that it could be once more. Flashpoints like Taiwan, Scarborough shoal, or some other meaningless piece of territory that is of no strategic importance could draw the United States military into a fight again. U.S. policy makers could decide that a hostile China needs to be deterred because America doesn’t want to look like Neville Chamberlain the Appeaser.

This has been the historic tendency for the United States and it speaks to a broader theme in international politics that most realist theories overlook, even offensive realism: states that are perfectly secure are still prone to compete and are even willing to send their armies to far-away locations where victory on the battle field does not provide any added security.

I do not mean to say I think the U.S. and China will fight a war. In the past, though, the U.S. has shown a willingness to go anywhere. If you need an example, consider Afghanistan. Any country that spends 11 years there has a lot of resolve. To find a place harder to fight conventional war, you’d have to leave Earth and start thinking about amphibious moon assaults. So in sum there are three takeaways. 1. The U.S. will fight and die for non-security needs; 2. It will go anywhere on Earth to do it; 3. Somewhere around China is likely to be the next spot. It’s not inevitable, though. After all, anarchy is what states make of it.