Iranian Nuclear Weapons: Why There Won't Be an Arms Race

It’s not hard to find bad takes on what needs to be done about Iran’s nuclear program. Like most complicated political issues, coming up with answers is time consuming and intellectually taxing. On that point, a recent Washington Post column by Henry Kissinger elucidates the conventional thinking of one important—yet woefully misbegotten—viewpoint on the Iranian nuclear arms program: the Middle East nuclear arms race theory (MENART).

Kissinger describes three levels of weaponization: 1. delivery vehicle; 2. capacity to enrich uranium; and 3. development of warheads. He contends that drawing a red line at the third level, Obama’s position, cannot succeed because once a state is able to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), the hardest part, it is a short leap to warhead development. Thus, the line ought to be drawn at HEU enrichment.

Fine. If you want to keep Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, that’s probably right; however, stopping nuclear weaponization is only one part of the process.

Far more important is the rationale for why Iran would want a nuclear weapon and, for the purposes of this brief blog, what the effects of an Iranian nuclear weapon will be.

Here, Kissinger makes the reader think he should just retire. Kissinger contends that states capable of doing so will build nuclear weapons and an arms race will ensue, and, that “countries within the reach of Iran’s military but lacking a nuclear option would be driven to reorient their political alignment toward Tehran.”

In other words, Kissinger expects an Iranian nuclear weapon to radically reorder the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East by way of shifting alliances and generating dangerous arms races.

There are three components to the arms race argument that Kissinger and many others are making: first, they assume that all states in the region will be deeply afraid of an Iranian nuclear weapon. Second, those strong enough to do so will build their own nuclear weapons program. Third, those too weak to do so, left with no other choice, will be forced to align with Iran. Thus, in IR speak, Iran’s nukes are a classic bandwagoning vs. balancing dilemma.

The arms race argument is wrong for six crucial reasons:

First, there is no reason to believe that Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon will greatly threaten the safety of any of its neighbors. Iran’s nuclear weapons program is focused on the United States primarily and Israel secondarily. While Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia might prefer a world without Iranian nuclear weapons, they are unlikely to be so perturbed that they will see the need for their own weapons program and the subsequent round of western sanctions that would be sure to follow.

Second, the United States would likely extend its nuclear umbrella (the promise to defend non-nuclear states in the event of a nuclear strike) to those states that do feel threatened by an Iranian nuclear weapon. This is a better option than expending the resources and risking the international political backlash that would accompany any aspiring nuclear weapons state’s progress.

Third, when Israel developed its own nuclear weapons in the late 1960s, no nuclear arms race ensued. If any country would be expected to spawn an arms race in a region dominated by Arab-speaking Muslims, it would be Israel. Thus, the most applicable test case we have available indicates that there would be no arms race.

Fourth, a state that is interested in deterring another state from using its nuclear weapons does not require nuclear weapons to do so. Deterrence works when you can make the other side think the costs of a certain action will exceed the attendant benefits. This can be achieved passively in a great many cases. In other words, Iran’s neighbors are likely to perceive its nuclear weapon as defensive, knowing that Iran stands to gain very little from launching an unprovoked first strike against one of its neighbors.

Fifth, states that may be wary of an Iranian nuclear weapon will have to deal with the collective action problem. Structural realism tends to assume that states always act fervently to protect their national security interests and so can be expected to balance against pervasive threats. In practice, states frequently under-balance, opening themselves up to dangerous manipulation by stronger powers (France in the lead up to World War II is a good example). Building up military power is expensive and time-consuming.

Sixth, nobody is going to bandwagon with Iran and those that might don’t matter. It’s unclear why anyone in the Middle East would all of a sudden join forces with Iran over a couple of nuclear weapons; nor is it perfectly clear who would. Turkey is part of NATO and a close U.S. ally; Iraq has long been an adversary, though less so now; Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires; Saudi Arabia has the backing of the U.S. military and also hates Iran; Egypt is too far away to really care; and Syria is already an ally, though it may become less of one if Assad falls from power. For the most part, Iran plays the role of spoiler in the region. It’s no one’s natural ally.

In sum, arms races are never inevitable. States compete in arms races when the other state’s actions are perceived as a direct security threat and there is little indication that Iran’s neighbors view Iran’s nuclear program in that light. Additionally, sometimes states actually should arms race and choose not too (see point five). Quite simply, arms races don’t always take place, and when they do, it’s not always the worst thing.