Saturday, September 8, 2012

The Benefits of Leaking Intelligence

The recently released book chronicling the SEAL Team 6 raid that killed and captured Osama Bin Laden has garnered a lot of controversy of late for its release of sensitive and classified information. Earlier this summer, a similar string of outcries emerged in response to President Obama’s alleged carelessness in handling classified information in cases such as the so-called “kill list” or the use of cyber attacks against Iran. As conventional wisdom would have it, classified intelligence should never be leaked.

In reality, there are circumstances in which leaked intelligence could actually make a country more secure and could help to deter its adversaries. The best way to approach this issue is to ask the question, under what conditions is leaked intelligence harmful to national security? For sure, it is not in every situation.

In many cases, leaked intelligence could strengthen national security if certain capabilities need to be known by an adversary.

For instance, there is a famous scene in Dr. Strangelove where the title character chastises the Russians for not letting the Americans know that they were developing a doomsday device. The only way it could serve as a deterrent, he explains, is for the Russians to let the Americans know about it. If the U.S. had known that its actions would set off the doomsday device that would destroy the whole world, then it would think twice before acting. Instead, Russian operational security actually weakened deterrence.

In contrast, leaking information is harmful when it compromises human sources in an ongoing operation or when some specific collecting technology is revealed allowing the adversary to adjust and stay off the grid.

In Iran’s case, if the ayatollahs decide to build a nuclear weapon, the development of the device would have to be kept absolutely secret; however, once the bomb is ready, it serves no purpose if Iran’s adversaries do not know that it has gone nuclear.

For ongoing covert action, it is absolutely essential that sensitive information is not leaked.

None of this is to say that the intelligence community should abandon its long-held practice of training employees to keep quiet about what they do at work. The default position for all IC officers should be to not divulge highly classified information.

Having said that, though, it is important to understand when it is appropriate to leak intelligence, when it is dangerous to do so, and when it is inconsequential. It is not helpful when prominent elected officials decry any and all leaks as haphazard. One can certainly hold to the position that leaking intelligence for political gain is indecent, but it is a wholly different conversation if the case is to be made that leaks compromise national security.

If the U.S. is to have coercive leverage against its adversaries, there are certain situations where it is important that American capabilities and intentions be precisely known to adversaries so that they might think twice about challenging important U.S. interests. It may not be a good idea for a high value Al Qaeda target to know that he is next. But it is probably a good idea to make it publicly known that if he continues doing what he’s doing, he just might be.

2 comments:

  1. i follow your logic that sometimes it may be beneficial to a state for their secret or top secret information to make it into the hands of their adversaries. however, in response to "it is important to understand when it is appropriate to leak intelligence," i posit that it should always be the decision of the state whether or not that information should be released. intelligence agencies, i imagine, have done their fair share of "leaking" or even disinformation campaigns, but it is always the prerogative of the state and not the individual to determine whether a "leak" is beneficial. are you saying that some of these leaks may have been orchestrated, are you encouraging USG officials to authorize the release of certain information that may in fact serve our cause, or are you saying that the unauthorized release of top secret information on the part of public servants might not be that bad?

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  2. The leaks I've mentioned were made by the president, not individual intel officers. When I originally put these ideas on paper, I was thinking of people who were criticizing the president's decision to leak intel on the basis that they thought it was for political reasons.

    Declassification should go through the appropriate chains of command and should not be left up to people with a guilty conscience.

    I meant to target my argument at very specific cases--the use of Stuxnet against Iran, the release of Bin Laden raids intel, and the agent who infiltrated AQ in Yemen this summer. People were calling out the president as if it was always dangerous to leak intel and that it should never be done. All I 'm trying here is to give a guide for when info should be classified and when it should be declassified and not the leaking is good.

    I should have distinguish between leaking and declassifying.

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