Framing the Gun Control Debate

When nearly 4,000 people were killed on September 11, 2001, no one argued that the United States ought to be content with the status quo. In seeking to ensure that there would be no sequel to 9/11, particularly of the nuclear variety, the American taxpayers have spent somewhere between one and four trillion dollars in the spirit of “never again.”

Amazingly, that same year, more than 20,000 American citizens lost their lives as the result of a fatal gunshot wound. And yet no public policy officials called for action. Each year since, similar numbers of Americans have lost their lives at the end of a barrel of a gun. More than half of these deaths are suicides.

This debate is not new and the factions on either side are firmly entrenched in their positions, but the tragic events at Newtown, CT have brought the gun control debate back into the mainstream spotlight.

Unfortunately, the debate is almost never properly framed.

There are two main problems with the present state of the gun control debate; first, the nature of the problem is rarely defined in a way that lends itself to clear public policy analysis. In other words, it is not quite clear what exactly the problem is. Second, partly because they don’t agree on what specifically the problem is, the two camps in the debate (what might be called the “pro-gun control” and “pro-gun rights” sides) vehemently disagree with one another on the role of legislation.

Furthermore, debates over gun control very quickly escalate into the land of character assassination and absurdly constructed straw men. The sensible, workable arguments go unheard and are instead drowned out by ludicrous, inaccurate mischaracterizations.

This is particularly troubling given that by 2015, according to a study done last year, the average American is, statistically, more likely to die from a gunshot wound than in a car accident. This has less to do with growing gun violence, the study finds, and has more to do with public policy measures that have made car travel much safer. This augurs well for a legislative answer to gun violence.

So, how should the gun violence problem be measured? For starters, it is worth pointing out that per capita gun deaths (as measured per 100,000) are vastly higher in the United States than they are in most other rich countries. To put it in context, the U.S. ranks just ahead of Mexico but behind many of its peers like Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Norway.

Without question, the U.S. has a bigger problem with gun violence than one would expect when compared to other similar countries.

This is the problem that should bother citizens and should be the thing that inspires policy responses. Sadly, it rarely ever is. The tragedy of Newtown notwithstanding, the better metric for success is not the number of high-profile murders; rather, the true measure of success is comparative murder rates from year-to-year as well as gun deaths per capita.

Thus, tragedies like Aurora, Columbine, and Newtown should be wakeup calls, examples of the worst case scenarios. However, the real problem is in the aggregate data and the comparatively high number of gun deaths in the U.S. each year.

What, then, are the policy solutions? Definitive answers to that question are beyond the scope of this little blog (hopefully to be filled in by readers’ comments?), but there are a few myths worth debunking that both sides of the debate need to come to grips with if the problem—and indeed there is a problem—is ever to be resolved.

Three myths need debunking, two of them by the pro-gun rights people, and one of them by the pro-gun control people.

Myth #1: Adding guns to the general public will decrease the number of gun deaths.

Those who argue this point usually point to Florida where the state legislature passed a law authorizing conceal and carry during the 1980s. Indeed, violent crime seemed to have decreased as a result. The key point of this argument is that when law-breakers or would be murders are unaware of who is armed and who is not, they become risk-averse and are less willing to act violently. This is not wrong, but it is deeply flawed because it fails to take into account two important factors. First, many other states have passed similar laws but have seen no corresponding drop in gun violence indicating that conceal-and-carry laws may be serendipitous. Second, would-be murderers would have to be well-versed in their state and county’s laws on gun usage. It may be difficult for some to ascertain this information. Moreover, anyone who is angry enough to kill in the first place is unlikely to suddenly have a change of heart because of the slight chance his target might be armed. In fact, conceal and carry gives all the more reason to shoot first, hence the advantage of having “the fastest gun in the west.”

Myth #2: Strong gun control laws cause gun violence to increase.

This is the inverse of the first myth. In the way that more guns increase the costs of trying to shoot someone because he/she might be armed, so it is argued that more stringent gun laws will make the world more dangerous. The causal mechanism is that only law-abiding citizens would turn in their weapons thus inadvertently emboldening murders who don’t respect the law as it is. While applicable in some circumstances, this argument overlooks some hugely important factors. First, strong control laws are almost always in response to an already-violent situation. In other words, gun control laws tend to come after the fact, are often too-little-too-late, but almost always correlate with high gun murder rates. Second, stringent gun control regulations may correspond with high murder rates in some cases, but in many others, strong gun control laws work extraordinarily well. To get a general sense of gun control laws’ effectiveness, you need to look at cases where it works as well as cases where it fails and then try to figure where your city or state lies. To categorically dismiss all increases in gun control laws is irresponsible.

Myth #3: Gun laws in places like Australia and Great Britain should be the model in the United States.

It is 100% true that Australia and Great Britain (and even China) have much fewer gun deaths than the U.S. (for the best articulation of this position, see Fareed Zakaria’s Op-Ed in the Washington Post from December 19^th). It is also true that they have stronger gun laws; however, it is wrong to think that what worked in one place will work perfectly well when applied to a totally different locale. First, passing federal regulations is much more difficult in the United States where so much power is delegated to state governments. Second, the places where these regulations would have the most teeth, in the state legislatures, can be offset by the ease of transfer from one state to another. Growing up 45 minutes from Connecticut, I know how easy it is to smuggle sales-tax-exempt clothing from the Danbury Mall back across the porous New York State line. Third, America has a deeply embedded gun culture that has no analogue in most other countries. In other words, there is no Texas in Great Britain. Additionally, most people who own guns, perhaps the majority of them, are quite responsible.

A solution?

I can think of at least three things that would help frame a more useful way of looking at this problem. First, pro-gun control people need to take a different approach to restricting public access to guns. Typically, they argue things like “why would anyone need an assault rifle?” “magazines should be limited to 10 rounds per clip,” or “certain high caliber rounds should be banned,” say anything higher than .223. This is a good start but still does not address the fact that someone armed with a .22 holding 10 bullets can still kill 10 people. It’s the old adage “don’t blame the arrows, blame the Indian.”

Second, pro-gun rights folks need to have a better perspective on the 2^nd amendment. Your right to own a fire arm is not equal to your right to free speech. The idea that guns don’t kill people and that people kill people is simply ridiculous. A gun exists solely to kill. Someone bent on killing a mass number of people is hard pressed to find something as efficient and easy to handle as a gun. It takes time and expertise to build a bomb and it is hard to do so with any kind of stealth. I don’t know if it’s ever been tried, probably not because it would be so frightening, but you could probably train a monkey how to fire a gun.

Third, and finally, as alluded to before, the horror of Newtown notwithstanding, the real troubling statistic is the staggeringly high number of gun deaths that take place each year in this country, many of which are suicides and so are totally unaffected by measures like conceal and carry legislation. As a result, policy success should be measured by that aggregate number. Diminishing the 30,000-something number slowly but surely should be how we think about gun control success in this country.

Significantly more people die with guns each year than have died in the entire War on Terror. It would be nice to see the 27 deaths at Newtown spur a long-awaited for debate on gun violence that measures success in the right way and that emphasizes the good effects of public policy. Otherwise there will surely be more. This is a problem that can be solved but it requires the two sides to first understand what is at stake and then, more importantly, to understand each other.

The Real Winner in Gaza Last Week: Iran

In case you haven’t been paying attention to the news lately, Palestinians and Israelis don’t get along very well. In the eight days of fighting between November 16^th and 24^th, an estimated 160 or so Palestinians and 6 Israelis were killed. Small skirmishes like these aren’t meant to garner large-scale strategic effects, but the most recent spat between Israel and Hamas/Gaza did help out one country in the region: Iran. Ok, it was hardly a game-changer for Iran either, but Hamas’ latest rocket attack against Israel—enabled largely by new Fajr-5 rockets imported from Iran—is indicative of Iran’s broader strategic thinking in the region.

Iran’s military and economic support for Hamas is motivated by two key calculations.

Iranian Nuclear Weapons: Why There Won't Be an Arms Race

It’s not hard to find bad takes on what needs to be done about Iran’s nuclear program. Like most complicated political issues, coming up with answers is time consuming and intellectually taxing. On that point, a recent Washington Post column by Henry Kissinger elucidates the conventional thinking of one important—yet woefully misbegotten—viewpoint on the Iranian nuclear arms program: the Middle East nuclear arms race theory (MENART).

Kissinger describes three levels of weaponization: 1. delivery vehicle; 2. capacity to enrich uranium; and 3. development of warheads. He contends that drawing a red line at the third level, Obama’s position, cannot succeed because once a state is able to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), the hardest part, it is a short leap to warhead development. Thus, the line ought to be drawn at HEU enrichment.

Fine. If you want to keep Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, that’s probably right; however, stopping nuclear weaponization is only one part of the process.

Far more important is the rationale for why Iran would want a nuclear weapon and, for the purposes of this brief blog, what the effects of an Iranian nuclear weapon will be.

The Sources of American Exceptionalism

If you do not believe that the United States is an exceptional nation, then you can still go on to lead a very productive, fulfilling life. Promotions, opportunities to show initiative, and the respect of your peers are still attainable goals. This is not true, however, if you aspire to have a career as a United States politician. Presidential elections always at some point have a who-thinks-America-is-more-exceptional debate, particularly on the topic of foreign policy.

America is indeed an exceptional nation; it was the world’s first modern democracy and is still a model liberal society. Having said that, the conventional thinking about America’s exceptional character—capitalism, individualism, pluralism, rags-to-riches opportunism, etc.—misses some important inputs that have created the exceptional nation we all love. America is exceptional for reasons other than just its political institutions and ideology. Two important, often overlooked, factors have been instrumental in the United States’ ability to thrive.

Dear Obama, About Israel and The Palestinians…

Last Wednesday, Marc Lynch blogged about the foreign policy issues that deserved increased attention in Obama’s second administration. In the lineup, as usual, is the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.He wrote, “the new administration should try to take advantage of the reorientation of Hamas toward Qatar, and work with Egypt to make a serious push to finally reconstitute a representative and legitimate Palestinian negotiating partner. It should also do what it can to encourage the renewal of a peace camp in the upcoming Israeli election. Those two steps would at least set the stage for a possible return to peace talks, though I don't think anyone's optimistic.”

Why Your Congressman Has More Character Than Mother Theresa

Why don’t people like politicians? Is it because they’re bad people? Is it because good people can’t make it to the top? It’s hard to say exactly why, but there is no disputing the fact that Americans don’t think particularly highly of their elected officials. Filibusters have dramatically spiked under president Obama and public vitriol is as vitriolic as it has ever been. I posit three causes of this problem and three possible reasons to be optimistic.

Hurricanes and Politics

Hurricane Sandy’s mad dash towards the east coast of the United States—the country’s most valuable real estate—is a good reminder of the unpredictability of international events. Rightly or wrongly, presidents, department secretaries, ranking members of congress, and other important people frequently get blamed for a lot of what goes wrong in this country and, quite often, for what goes wrong outside of it. It varies from case to case as to just how much blame can be placed on individual leaders; as Kanye West has argued, even the effects of hurricanes can be blamed on important political officials, but without question, the mere arrival of a destructive hurricane, while potentially disastrous, is certainly no one’s fault.

But why is it that so many other sticky things which are very difficult to affect (such as unemployment, domestic political disputes abroad like the Arab spring or, even, post-hurricane disaster relief) are blamed on key political leaders? Why aren’t voters more sympathetic to the difficulties of running a highly complex organization like a country? Perhaps the better question is, why would anyone willingly choose a line of work for which there is very little praise when things go well, a never ending supply of vitriol when things go wrong, and the knowledge going in that you could climb the Matterhorn barefoot in January and 50% of the country would still ask why you didn’t surmount Everest?