Hurricanes and Politics

Hurricane Sandy’s mad dash towards the east coast of the United States—the country’s most valuable real estate—is a good reminder of the unpredictability of international events. Rightly or wrongly, presidents, department secretaries, ranking members of congress, and other important people frequently get blamed for a lot of what goes wrong in this country and, quite often, for what goes wrong outside of it. It varies from case to case as to just how much blame can be placed on individual leaders; as Kanye West has argued, even the effects of hurricanes can be blamed on important political officials, but without question, the mere arrival of a destructive hurricane, while potentially disastrous, is certainly no one’s fault.

But why is it that so many other sticky things which are very difficult to affect (such as unemployment, domestic political disputes abroad like the Arab spring or, even, post-hurricane disaster relief) are blamed on key political leaders? Why aren’t voters more sympathetic to the difficulties of running a highly complex organization like a country? Perhaps the better question is, why would anyone willingly choose a line of work for which there is very little praise when things go well, a never ending supply of vitriol when things go wrong, and the knowledge going in that you could climb the Matterhorn barefoot in January and 50% of the country would still ask why you didn’t surmount Everest?

America's New York Yankees Foreign Policy

Watching the Yankees lose in embarrassing fashion to the Detroit Tigers last week made me realize something: Americans are a lot like Yankee fans. The Yankee fan is unique in that he thinks, starting from the day pitchers and catchers report in February, that it is destiny that the Yankees will win the World Series every single year. The only thing that could possibly stop the Bronx Bombers from laying waste to the major leagues come October is bad leadership, lack of focus, no heart, or something. Usually they’re just really angry at the world. Lost on all Yankee fans is the notion that the other teams are also full of young men who were once young boys that dreamed of playing in the major leagues and when they finally make it to the big stage, they too enjoy winning and try their hardest to do so.

What is Brazil Up To?

What is Brazil up to? That is the question national security planners should be asking. Since abandoning its nuclear weapons program in the late 1990s, Brazil has appeared the model for nonproliferation. Relations with Argentina, its longtime rival, have warmed and the two states even cooperate on nuclear and other security issues. Compared to the Middle East, South America is stable and peaceful, hardly an environment that would necessitate nuclear weapons. Yet, changes in Latin America and a perceived shift in the balance of power away from the West require a reconsideration of that assessment. Moreover, Brazil’s refusal to adopt the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Additional Protocol and its pursuit of nuclear propulsion technology raise worrisome questions about its intentions.

To Brazil, Latin America is not as stable as often believed. To the north, Venezuela chaffs at the prospect of Brazil as regional hegemon. In 2010, Russia and Venezuela reached a deal to build the Latin American country’s first nuclear reactor. Although the project was scrapped after the Fukushima disaster, the prospect remains. Venezuela has also challenged Brazilian influence in Bolivia and Ecuador, two countries that have or have attempted to nationalize the facilities of Petrobras, Brazil’s state oil company. In 2008, the government of Hugo Chavez levied a controversial $282 million tax on a Brazilian construction firm. Such actions have riled Brazilian leaders.

Further north, the United States, long the guarantor of South American stability, appears hamstrung by economic challenges. According to former Argentine diplomat Emilio Cárdenas, Brazil believes that the West is in gradual decline and that Brazil is jockeying with other rising nations for position. This shift in the balance of power engenders a greater degree of uncertainty about U.S. capabilities and intentions in the future. Such uncertainty, in addition to Brazil’s new political and economic prowess, gives it the ability to challenge the U.S. at the margins of its power. Moreover, if the ability of the U.S. to maintain order in the hemisphere is truly constrained, it is incumbent upon the Brazilian government to seek alternative sources of security.

VP Debate and Foreign Policy

At the end of the Vice Presidential debate, Paul Ryan asked the essential question that Americans answer every four years when they think about who should be the next president: “We face a very big choice. What kind of country are we going to be?”

A big problem for the Romney campaign has been painting a distinctly different vision of the future. On foreign policy, the Romney/Ryan ticket is in the awkward position of having to differentiate itself from a foreign policy that has, for the most part, been hiccup-less. As someone who loves foreign affairs, in the eros sense of the word, the VP debate was a can’t miss. The problem is, there just isn’t much difference between Obama’s foreign policy and Romney’s would-be foreign policy.

There is one simple reason for this. The grand strategic debate at the highest level has already been settled: the United States should stay world number one. Foreign policy wonks will debate concepts like off-shore balancing (a strategy of restraint that opts to play regional powers off of each other rather than actively getting involved), selective engagement (a strategy that advocates active US involvement only in the most strategically vital regions), and primacy (a strategy that calls for US dominance and dissuasion of any peers from challenging the U.S.). But the central tenets of American grand strategy since the end of the Cold War have not changed: we need to stay world number one and we need to promote democracy abroad where possible.

We do face a choice this election, but it is a choice about operationalizing a vision for America’s role in the world under primacy.

Appeasement: We Need More of It

Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.

These are not the words of the appeaser-in-chief, Barack Hussein Obama, nor were they the words of the appeaser of all appeasers, Neville Chamberlain. It was actually Winston Churchill who recognized the usefulness of appeasing adversaries in a 1950 speech to the House of Commons.

Appeasement is not a viable strategy anymore. If you want to be president of the United States, you’re better caught saying “f*** Iran” than saying “appease Iran.”  How did it happen that a strategy that was once regarded as a prudent instrument of statecraft – even to the tough-talking, masculine Winston Churchill - has become about as politically tenable as advocating for the repeal of the 19^th amendment? There are two reasons.

It's Not 2001 Anymore.

Last August, David Feith, a regular contributor to the Wall Street Journal penned an op-ed describing how the President Obama allowed the UN to tie his hands in dealing with Syria.

Mr. Feith criticizes the Obama Administration for not leveraging the opportunity to weaken the Iranian regime by taking stronger action against Syria. However, what he suggests - various methods of intervention - is predicated upon a false understanding of why Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons in the first place.

Little Wars, China, and Mobb Deep

At two pivotal moments in its 67 years of hegemony, the United States fought two small wars that were meant to send a message more than they were meant to preserve a vital interest. The first, the Korean War in 1950, was a message to the world that aggression towards one’s neighbors would not be permitted under America’s watch, especially if the aggressors were Communists. The U.S. could have easily survived if the Korean peninsula had become a Communist bastion; a unified Communist Korea would not have posed a security threat. But the U.S. wanted to show that security was not its only priority. Additionally, where the old League of Nations paid mere lip service to collective security and the rule of law, the United States wanted to demonstrate that it was willing to back up its principles with military force even in regions that were not vitally important.

There was a specific audience in Korea: the Soviet Union. And what was that message? Wars of aggression are going to have consequences. As long as you stay in your box, you won’t be touched. Venture outside, and you will get touched.